(P)KT-IEE: Secure Key Transparency Protocols for Interoperable End-to-End Encrypted Message Systems

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ABSTRACT
End-to-End-Encrypted (E2EE) messaging services are a key privacy enhancing technology enabling free and open speech on the Internet. They are widely deployed and very popular with large userbases. E2EE relies critically on the trustworthy distribution and storage of users’ public keys. To that end, Key Transparency (KT) has been deployed by popular platforms (such as Whatsapp) and many designs and refinements have been proposed. However, KT in the interoperable E2EE setting has not yet been investigated. We address the challenge of distributing and trusting keys across platform boundaries and propose a Secure Key Transparency Protocol for Interoperable End-to-End Encrypted Message Systems (P)KT-IEE. We also present a privacy preserving variant of our proposed protocol. This work is timely since the EU’s Digital Markets Act obliges E2EE messaging platforms to allow users from different platforms to be able to communicate with each other. Our security and performance analysis show that our protocols are secure, private, resist local surveillance, and practical (allowing for trade-offs between light-weight and privacy preservation).

KEYWORDS
key transparency, interoperability, end-to-end encryption, key distribution, message service provider systems

1 INTRODUCTION
Platform interoperability between end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging services will enable a user of one E2EE service provider (SP) to communicate with a user of another E2EE service provider, for example Whatsapp and Signal, without the need to create accounts on both services. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) came into force in November 2022, and Article 7 obligates gatekeepers (service providers of large message platforms) to allow interoperability of number-independent interpersonal communications services [1]. There are a number of benefits: eradicating platform monopolies, supporting smaller platforms and thus choice, and empowering users to use SPs of their own choosing and not because of social and market pressures to go where other users are. Indeed, platform interoperability will contribute to freedom of speech by enabling users to form communities online irrespective of censorship in their countries for certain messaging apps [9].

E2EE messaging depends on the security and authenticity of users’ secret and public keys. When Alice wants to communicate with Bob on the same platform, she depends on the platform to securely provide Bob’s authentic public key. Both Alice and Bob have to trust that their platform is acting honestly.

Key Transparency is a mechanisms that has recently been adopted by platforms, like Whatsapp, to provide this trust to their own users. To realize interoperability in E2EE messaging platforms a “key” challenge is how to design transparent mechanisms for distributing and authenticating users’ public keys across SP boundaries. Our proposed protocols, (P)KT-IEE, allow users of one SP to verify the authenticity of the public keys of users of another SP with trade-offs between performance and privacy.

Our Contributions. In this work, we present KT-IEE, a secure KT protocol, and its private variant PKT-IEE, which are, to the best of our knowledge the first for interoperable end-to-end message service provider systems. Below, we elaborate our contributions:

• A comprehensive problem description of the KT challenge in interoperable communication systems,
• The KT-IEE protocol design,
• An extension, PKT-IEE, that provides sender-recipient privacy unlinkability where the sender’s SP does not learn the identity of the recipient on another SP,
• A security analysis shows resilience against potential security breaches,
• A discussion on performance of KT-IEE shows that there is not a significant computation overhead for clients and servers.

2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 E2EE and Key Transparency
E2EE ensures that communications between an SP’s users remain private, and no one, not even the SP can eavesdrop on them. The public/private keys are the essence of E2EE messaging service. When a new user registers with an E2EE message service system, the user’s device generates public/private key pairs. The public key is sent to the SP where it is stored in a secure key-store server. The private key never leaves the user’s device and is stored in a secured area on the device.

When a user wishes to send a message to another user for the first time, the message is encrypted on the sender’s device by first retrieving the recipient’s public key from the SP’s key-store server. When the message reaches the recipient’s device, it is decrypted using the private key which is stored locally on recipient’s device.
This encryption process establishes a secure communication channel that safeguards sensitive information. To reply, the recipient performs the same steps as above.

In a way, the secure encrypted communication in messaging services completely rests on trusting the service provider to provide the correct public keys. A compromised SP (either maliciously or through legal or coercive pressure) could replace a user’s public key by one created by the service provider (i.e. the private key is known to them and can decrypt messages). This undermines trust in E2EE platforms, and as a response numerous solutions for Key Transparency have been proposed by researchers and industry. However, there has been little attention towards the trust issues regarding public key storage and distribution in interoperable E2EE messaging systems. While there are a myriad of challenges to inter operability in E2EE messaging, ranging from standardization to spam abuse and content moderation to market competition [1], we focus on providing trust for public keys through key transparency across service providers.

We first provide brief technical details of CONIKS [7], on which (P)KT-IEE is based and then we discuss closely related literature.

2.1.1 CONIKS. CONIKS is an end-user key verification service for sensitive communication systems that obviates the need for a global third party auditors thereby allowing the clients to efficiently monitor their key bindings for consistency. In this section we will highlight the core data structure design and key look-up operations in CONIKS. Interested readers may refer to the technical paper [7] for further details.

Core Data Structure. In CONIKS, clients’ ids (usernames, phone numbers, or other unique identifier) are bound to their private keys in a key-value directory. This directory is realized as a Merkle prefix tree [8] of all registered id-key bindings. This binary tree has three different types of nodes: interior, empty, and leaf, where the contents of each are hashed values using some collision-resistant hash function H(). The leaf node is a cryptographic commitment that binds the name (id) and public key data together. The root of the tree is signed with the private signing key of the SP and this signed tree root (the STR) is stored at a publicly accessible location. A new STR is regenerated whenever there is a change to the tree (either when it is rebuilt or when an item is inserted).

Key Validation. Once Alice creates an account with an E2EE messaging platform (say xyz.com), her public key is sent to the SP where it is inserted into the KT directory (Merkle prefix tree in the case of CONIKS) thus registering the name-to-key binding. To validate that her key was correctly inserted into the tree, Alice requests a proof from the SP’s directory. This proof is composed of the STR and an authentication path (or auth_path) from the leaf node for Alice’s id-key binding to the root. The auth_path is a list of hash values of the interior nodes. The particular interior nodes that are required depend on which leaf node to be verified, where each interior node provides the hash value required to calculate the value of the node higher up the tree. Alice thus calculates STR’ and if STR’ = STR then she is, with high probability, sure that her key has been correctly inserted into the tree and the public STR is linked to it. Alice continues to validate her keys periodically through this process. Please see the Appendix A for details of this operation.

Key Look-up. When Bob wants to communicate with Alice (both on xyz.com), he performs the following steps:

- **Bob looks up Alice’s public key by her username at xyz.com directory.** He receives Alice’s public key along with the auth_path for that key. Using the same validation steps as Alice above, he verifies the proof of inclusion for Alice’s key using the auth_path provided and the STR.
- **If validation is successful, Bob uses the provided public key for Alice to encrypt his message to her and then sends the message.**

2.2 Related Work

The authenticity of public keys is of critical importance not only to E2EE messaging but also to e-commerce. The roll out of SSL/TLS and the certificate authorities that play a part in the distribution architecture for public key cryptography enabled merchants and customers to conduct transactions without fearing eavesdroppers stealing credit card and other sensitive information. However, the authenticity of the public keys that SSL/TLS depend on is susceptible to rogue or compromised certificate authorities, with cases of fraudulently issued certs (i.e. public keys) allowing MITM and other attacks. To mitigate that threat, Certificate Transparency Logs (CT) [5] is the public, auditable, append-only certificate log. It creates an untrusted log of all certificates (i.e. public key to domain name bindings) issued that is cryptographically verifiable. Anyone may check that certificates exist in the log, and web servers can monitor the log for any discrepancies for certificates issued for their own domains. The security of the log and its hosts is critical hence distributing it across several locations and jurisdictions mitigates the threat of a single point of failure. Another approach [3] is to write the CT to an append-only distributed ledger (aka blockchain) that adopts X.509 certificate registration and validation methodology for SSL/TLS. It augments the chain-of-trust model by providing support for multi-layer scrutiny of the entire existing certificate system. Furthermore, it drops seamlessly into existing SSL/TLS protocols and is much simpler than other existing public log-based approaches.

Certificate logs allow anyone to enumerate every domain with a certificate in the log. This is a privacy issue in the E2EE setting because the size, membership, and system identifiers (e.g. phone numbers or real names) of the user-base of a platform is sensitive information. CONIKS [7] was the first protocol that avoids those privacy issues in key transparency. Like certificate logs, key transparency logs also require secure storage, thus [4] extends CONIKS by adopting append-only distributed ledger technology to reach consensus on the state of the key logs built by a key server, thus reducing collusion and single-point-of-failure risks. Another blockchain-based solution [2] relies on the Ethereum [11] protocol, which is a decentralized platform in which it is possible to reach consensus also about the state of some code using the smart contract paradigm.

Chase et al. [3] propose SEEMless, which provides a more rigorous security analysis than the prior work and can be seen as an extension to CONIKS. They introduce a primitive called verifiable key directory (VKD) with definitions of the required security properties and proofs of correctness of the underlying scheme. Their
implementation relies on local RAM storage to store all of the data required for key transparency. Parakeet [6], aims to overcome the scalability challenges of prior academic work that limit their usefulness for real-world E2EE messaging applications. Their ordered Zero-Knowledge Set (oZKS) cryptographic construction allows more efficient VKD with storage improvements of up to an order of magnitude over prior work.

Len et al. formally analyse and produce a mapping from the DMA to an abstract API to capture functionality for interoperable E2EE. They then use this high-level API to propose a possible design for an interoperable E2EE service. Our work is thus complementary and can be seen as fitting into their high-level service name discovery component with KT-IEE as a concrete design incorporating KT into E2EE, thus augmenting their retrieve key material functionality.

Our proposed protocols, (P)KT-IEE, based on CONIKS, are a concrete first step towards enabling trustworthy cross-platform E2EE communications.

3 SYSTEM MODEL
There are four entities involved in KT-IEE:

(1) E2EE message service providers X (SPX) and Y (SPY): Each service provider runs its own instance of a key transparency directory.
(2) Alice (C_X): Alice is a client of SPX. Alice’s device periodically validates her key bindings at SPX’s KT directory and can alert her in case of any unexpected keys found bound to her username.
(3) Bob (C_Y): Bob is a client of SPY. Bob’s device periodically validates his key bindings at SPY’s KT directory and can alert him in case of any unexpected keys found bound to his username.

SPX and SPY relay messages and distribute public keys among their own clients. They also distribute public keys of their clients to other service providers when requested.

3.1 Problem Statement
When C_b wants to communicate with C_a, he needs her public key for secure E2EE communications. C_b does a key look-up request for C_a’s username (or some other unique identifier used by her service) at SPX via SPY. C_b receives a response from SPX via SPY. There is a need of a protocol, initiated by C_b’s device b_d, to satisfy C_b that the response is authentic and the public key it receives actually belongs to C_a.

3.2 Assumptions
In this section, we outline the assumptions for service providers and their clients.

3.2.1 Service Provider Assumptions.
• We assume the existence of a PKI whereby each service provider can distribute their public encryption and verification keys to users of their own platform and users of other platforms. One way to achieve this is to “bake-in” keys into client software.
• Service providers act as “proxies” for communications between their users and those of other platforms. In other words, clients do not directly connect to each other’s devices over the network. A consequence of this is that censorship cannot be targeted against particular pairs of users by a network adversary.
• We assume that both service providers are able to be accessed by both their own users and also each other. In the case that one service provider is accessible, but the other is not (due to censorship for example), we assume that the service provider that is accessible is hosted outside the sphere of influence of the adversary such that that adversary cannot observe or block connection between the two providers.

3.2.2 Client Assumptions.
• Compromised client devices that report arbitrary results of the validation protocol or do not adhere to the E2EE protocol itself are out-of-scope.
• Clients validate their own keys frequently with their service provider and report any discrepancies in a public manner (i.e. so that other users do not trust the results of key look-up from that provider). This could be done over an out-of-band channel but, like other works in the literature, a solution is out of scope of this present work.
• Each client is registered with their SP and their public keys have been added (via KT) to the key directory and their devices hold their private key.

4 THREAT MODEL
We assume that E2EE messaging systems employ secure channels between client devices and servers operated by the service provider as well as between service providers’ servers. Hence, third party interference of the secure channel is detectable and does not impact the confidentiality or integrity of the communications. We assume that the service providers may observe all messages in the proposed protocol and can create or drop messages but are unable to break the encryption and signature schemes employed to protect the confidentiality or integrity of messages. Further, they may change, drop, or create any unprotected information in the protocol messages. The adversary can also observe the contents of the key-value storage data structure but is not interested in compromising it if the key transparency functionality it enables.

The service provider desires to remain reputable but may deviate from honestly running the protocol if it is undetectable. A service provider may act maliciously due to either its own volition or due to external threats like coercion by law enforcement or repressive regimes. However, client devices, and the messaging app itself, are considered secure and honest.

4.1 Adversary Goals
The aim of the adversary is to convince a client of another service provider that a key the adversary controls is actually the key of
some honest user on its platform and vice versa (convince its own user about a key from a user on another platform). KT-IEE aims to prevent this situation, assuming the KT functions of each service provider are operating correctly.

If the adversary is successful in achieving its goal of convincing a user that a fake key is authentic then they may use that ability to eavesdrop on conversations (Meddler-in-the-middle, MITM) or fabricate messages (or whole conversations) with honest users (Impersonation).

We next describe KT-IEE and discuss how it prevents attacks in Section 6.

5 THE KT-IEE PROTOCOL

The objective of KT-IEE is to provide a secure, practical and consistent public key transparency mechanism to the users in an interoperable E2EE messaging scenario. In Table 1, we describe the notation used in the description of our proposed protocol. The schematic of all phases of KT-IEE: setup, key look-up in cross platform, response generation and response verification phases is depicted in Figure 3. The proposed protocol is defined in four phases described below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPX</td>
<td>Service Provider X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPY</td>
<td>Service Provider Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Alice, client of SPX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cb</td>
<td>Bob, client of SPY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a,aid</td>
<td>Alice’s device and unique identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a, g^a</td>
<td>Alice’s private and public keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b, b^id</td>
<td>Bob’s device and unique identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b, g^b</td>
<td>Bob’s private and public keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PKx, SKx)</td>
<td>Encryption and decryption keys of SPX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(σ, λ = g^σ)</td>
<td>Signing and verification keys of SPX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PKy, SKy)</td>
<td>Encryption and decryption keys of SPY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(α, β = g^β)</td>
<td>Signing and verification keys of SPY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1 Setup Phase

5.1.1 Client. The process starts when the messaging apps are installed by clients on their devices. Registration of Ca and Cb with SPX and SPY is shown in Figure 1 and details for Ca are given in this section. Similar steps are taken by Cb’s device while registration and is not shown here. The Setup phase is described below.

- Let G be a prime order (g) group with g being generator of the group. Let Let H : {0,1}^* → Z_q^* be a secure cryptographic hash function. Here Z_q^* is a multiplicative group of integers modulo q.
  - Let α be an arbitrary variable such that α ∈ Z_q^*.
  - αd generates a public key g^α.
  - αd communicates g^α to her service provider SPX.
  - αd stores secret key α in its secure local storage.

5.1.2 Service Provider. SPX generates a Merkle prefix tree with all the name to-key bindings [10] of its registered clients. SPX creates a Schnorr signature (s, R) for the root of the public key directory tree that we’ll refer to as the Signed Tree Root (STR). Details follow: SPX selects a random value k and generates a signature value R:

\[ R = g^k \]

The value of s is:

\[ s = k - (H(STR||R), σ) = k - E.σ \]

Here, E = H(STR||R) and | denotes the concatenation and H denotes a secure cryptographic hash function. Thus, the signature on STR is (s, R). SPX publishes (STR, (s, R)) to a publicly accessible location. The generation of new STRs by service providers happens at regular intervals (whenever the tree is updated with new and updated keys).

5.1.3 Client-side Inclusion Validation. In response to a validation request, SPX returns the full authentication path (auth_path) for Ca’s binding in the Merkle prefix tree. The auth_path is a proof of inclusion which reveals that an index exists in the directory corresponding to Ca. Recalling [7], the leaf nodes are not plaintext public keys, they are a cryptographic commitment to the name and key data. To prove inclusion of the full name-to-key binding, SPX provides the opening of the commitment in addition to the authentication path. In the final step, Ca recomputes the root of the tree using the auth_path and checks that the computed root is consistent with the public STR. Ca should periodically perform this auditing to ensure the consistency of her public keys.

5.2 Cross Platform Key Look-up

Figure 2 depicts the steps taken when Cb wants to communicate with Ca. Cb sends a key look-up query, Q(aid, bid), to SPX via SPY (step 1 and 2 in the figure).

5.2.1 Response Generation. In order to generate the response, SPX first:

- Computes a string Z ← aid∥|g^aid|auth_path.
- Then using Schnorr signatures, SPX signs Z with its signing key to make sure that the recipient can verify the authenticity.
5.3 Response Verification

$C_b$ receives $(Z, Z')$ from $SP_Y$ and first verifies the signature $Z'$. Let $R_0 = g''^E = g^k$ and $E_0 = Hash(R_0 || Z)$. If $E_0 = E$, then the signature is verified. In detail,

$R = R_0 \cdot E^k$  \(= g''^E \cdot x^E = g^k = R\)

Hence, $E_0 = Hash(R_0 || Z) = Hash(R || Z) = E$. After the successful verification of $Z'$, from the string $Z$, $b_d$ recovers $a_id$, $g^a$ and along with $auth_path$ sends $E_{id}$ to $SP_X$. $SP_X$ confirms $a_id$ was the one sent in the look-up response, using the information in the $auth_path$. $b_d$ regenerates STR using the information in the $auth_path$. It then proceeds to verify the consistency of publicly available signed STR with the generated root tree as follows:

- $R_0 = g''^E$
- $E_0 = Hash(R_0 || STR)$

If $E_0 = E$, then the signature is verified. If the signature is verified, $Bob$ is certain about the consistency of public key of $Alice$ because $STR$ represents that a service provider is maintaining a linear history of public keys of $Alice$. $Bob$ can now encrypt its message using $Alice$'s public key and can then send the message. If the signature is not verified, it is possible that the $SP_X$ has generated a fork in $Alice$’s STR history or there has been a change in $Alice$’s public key due to device loss or any other reasons.

5.4 E2EE Message exchange

Once the public key $g^a$ is successfully verified by $C_b$, he can send the encrypted message to $C_a$. Let $m$ be the message that $C_b$ wishes to send to $C_a$ (via $SP_Y$ and $SP_X$; step 5). $C_b$ creates:

$$M = ((Enc_{FK_X}(Enc_{g^a}(m, b_id)), a_id), SP_X)$$

and sends it to $SP_Y$ who, seeing that it is destined for $SP_X$, forwards just the encrypted part of the tuple. $SP_X$ decrypts the message and sees that the inner encrypted data is for $C_a$ and sends her $Enc_{g^a}(m, b_id)$. $C_a$ can then, using her private decryption key $a$, recover $m$ and also see the message is from $b_id$. To reply, she can now execute key look-up using KT-IEE to recover the public key of $C_b$ from $SP_Y$ using $b_id$.

6 SECURITY ANALYSIS

We now discuss the security of KT-IEE and its resistance to an adversary that wishes to convince an honest user (e.g. $Bob$) that a key the adversary controls is actually that of another honest user (e.g. $Alice$).

Let us first consider the case that $Bob$’s service provider, $SP_Y$, attempts this attack. Let’s assume that the adversary has generated a private/public key pair $y, g^y$. Then, when the key look-up response, $(Z, Z')$, is received from $SP_X$, the adversary may try to replace $g^a$ with $g^y$. If $Bob$ accepts this change and uses $g^y$ to encrypt messages meant for $Alice$, then $SP_Y$ can read these messages and can forward them encrypted with the correct key $g^a$. This is the meddler-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and $SP_Y$ may (selectively) use it to compromise $Bob$’s communications. However, $Bob$ will not accept this change because $SP_Y$ will not be able to produce a valid signature $(Z')$ since it does not have access to $SP_X$’s private signing key $a$ to sign the changed original response $Z$.

Let’s now assume that $SP_Y$ creates an account on $SP_X$’s platform with the identifier $y_id$ and key pair $y, g^y$, and that the binding $y_id, g^y$ has been registered in $SP_X$’s KT directory. Then in the look-up request issued by $Bob$, $SP_Y$ can replace $a_id$ with $y_id$. $SP_X$ will respond with $(Z = y_id || g^y || auth_path, Z')$. $Bob$ will do not accept this response since $b_d$ checks if the identifier in the request matches the one in the response. Here they do not since $a_id \neq y_id$, $SP_Y$ can also not replace $b_id$ with $a_id$ because once again it cannot then produce a valid $Z'$ on the changed $Z$ since it does not have access to $SP_X$’s private signing key. Hence, it is not possible for $SP_Y$ to conduct a MITM attack on its own users when they communicate with users from another service.

Now, let’s consider that $SP_X$ expects to MITM communications initiated by $Bob$. We will note here that unlike before, signatures do not provide any protection from $SP_X$ since it has access to the signing key $a$. Instead, we will depend on the security properties of $SP_X$’s KT scheme.

Let’s assume that $SP_X$ generates a private/public key pair $x, g^x$ and inserts it into its KT under the identity $x_id$—it cannot register it under $a_id$ without invalidating its KT security since $Alice$ is frequently checking her key bindings. Then, instead of responding...
Setup Phase

1. GenEncKeyPair($g_a, a$
2. GenEncKeyPair($g_b, b$
3. GenSignKeyPair($\alpha, \beta$
4. GenSignKeyPair($\lambda, \sigma$
5. $Q(\text{aid}, \text{bid})$

Key look-up query

1. $Q(\text{aid}, \text{bid})$

Response Generation

1. $Z \leftarrow (\text{aid}, g^a, \text{auth\_path}) \leftarrow \text{SIG}_\sigma(Z)$
2. $(Z, Z')$

Key Verification

1. $bd$ recovery $\text{aid}, g^a, \text{auth\_path}$
2. Generate root of directory tree and verify root with STR
with $a_{id}||g^x||auth\_path$ it sends back $a_{id}||g^x||auth\_path'$, where $auth\_path'$ is correct for $x_{id}$. However, Bob will not accept this response since the KT verification step will not complete successfully since $(a_{id}, auth\_path')$ will cause a failure. If, instead, in the response $a_{id}$ is replaced with $x_{id}$ then, like before, $b_{id}$ will stop here since the identifiers in the request and response do not match. In effect, $SP_X$ cannot attack users of other services without also compromising its own KT, which we have assumed is not desirable.

In real life it may be argued that $SP$s have reputations to uphold and that collusion would likely be risky and may lead to reputation loss. However, if it is undetectable then both $SP_X$ and $SP_Y$ may collude to compromise Bob’s communications with Alice. This means that now $SP_X$’s signatures are no protection from $SP_Y$ since $SP_X$ can share $σ$. This situation reduces to the case above where $SP_X$ is malicious, and again the security of the scheme rests on the integrity of $SP_Y$’s KT directory. In other words, even if both service providers collude, they cannot convince Bob to accept a malicious key without also compromising the integrity of $SP_Y$’s KT directory. In other words, they cannot collude to compromise each other’s userbase while at the same time maintaining an illusion of safety to satisfy their own userbases.

7 (P)KT-IEE: Private Interoperable Key Transparency

In the request and response messages between Bob and $SP_X$ above it is possible for $SP_Y$ to observe which user Bob wants to talk with, i.e. Alice. Indeed, this is a privacy issue not only for Bob but also since it may potentially reveal to $SP_Y$ the user identifiers and total number of users of $SP_X$. KT schemes like CONIKS protect these pieces of information from users in their own platforms. We next describe (P)KT-IEE, an extension of our proposal that provides the same privacy protection in the interoperable context, at the cost of additional cryptographic operations.

Let’s say that Bob wants to communicate with a user on $SP_X$’s platform. Our extension uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange between Bob and $SP_X$ to establish a shared secret key $k$. Bob uses the one-sided authenticated version of DH using $SP_X$’s public encryption key so that $SP_Y$ cannot interfere and succeed in MITMing this exchange. After the successful completion of the DH exchange, Bob’s look-up requests are now:

$$\text{Enc}_k(Q(a_{id},b_{id})),\text{ and the }SP_X’s\text{ look-up responses are:\text{Enc}_k(Z)}.$$ After decrypting these messages both $SP_X$ and Bob may proceed as before. Notice that the signature, $Z'$, is no longer needed since $SP_Y$ cannot interfere in this response.

Note that $SP_X$ still learns that Bob wishes to talk with Alice. In the same vein, in order to reply to Bob’s messages, Alice will request Bob’s key from $SP_Y$, which will reveal to $SP_Y$ that Alice is communicating with Bob. Further, the timing of look-up requests may allow Sp’s (without colluding) to infer likely communicating partners, for example, Alice may look-up Bob very soon after Bob’s message to her and so $SP_Y$ may infer that Alice and Bob are communicating. Even if Alice never looks up Bob, $SP_X$ may collude with $SP_Y$ and share information about look-up requests it sees.

As mitigation the look-up request from Bob for Alice’s key is changed to $\text{Enc}_k(Q(a_{id}))$. Notice from Section 5.4 that $b_{id}$ is included in every E2EE to Alice so she will know whose key to look-up to use with her reply. By symmetry, Alice’s look-up request hides her identity from $SP_Y$, and both Alice and Bob can communicate with each other without revealing to their own SP which user on her other platform they are communicating with. Furthermore, the look-up requests do not reveal information about each platform’s userbase. It should be noted that (P)KT-IEE is incentive compatible in that the SP that employs it enjoys privacy for their userbase.

However, traffic correlation is still possible since SPs can collude to share information about times messages are sent and received to infer which users are talking with each other. This is outside the threat model since E2EE messaging does not protect against this type of attack. A possible avenue would be to investigate schemes that integrate mix networks that provide protection against timing attacks and other meta-data attacks, however this is left as future work.

8 PERFORMANCE

We now discuss the relative cost of our schemes as compared to our reference CONIKS [7]. We provide an analytic look at the costs to clients and identify the additional overhead our schemes impose over the baseline in terms of number of operations.

8.0.1 Key Validation. In CONIKS [7], to monitor the consistency of its own key binding in KT directory, a client downloads the STR (64 bytes) and the auth_path. Assuming $N$ registered clients, the auth_path will be $\log_2 N$ hashes long, where each hash is 32 bytes. The total is $64 + \log_2 N \times 32$ bytes. The computational costs are one signature verification for the STR, and $\log_2 N$ hash and compare operations.

8.0.2 Key Look-up and Validation. A look-up and validation of another user on the same service is the same as above for KT-IEE. However, to do a cross-platform look-up under KT-IEE, the client needs to download the same amount as above and an additional signature $Z'$. This will result in one more signature validation operation than above to verify the authenticity of response message and a constant-time user_id comparison operation—to check if the ids in the request and response match.

In (P)KT-IEE, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is in addition to the above, with one less signature $Z'$ to download and verify. There is also the computational overhead of the secret key encryption and decryption operations at the server and client respectively.

An implementation of KT-IEE is on our roadmap, however, to provide expected concrete figures, we refer to the empirical results reported in the CONIKS [7] paper. From those results we can see that, on a 2 GHz Intel Core i7 laptop, for a directory with 10 million users, verifying the authentication path for a single key binding required on average 159μs (sampled over 1000 runs, with $σ = 30$). Signature verification averaged 400μs, dominating the cost of authentication path verification. Thus a KT-IEE implementation, will impose an additional 400μs for signature verification, or an increase of 4% than [7]. From the user’s perspective, DH key exchange may be completed in less than a second and comparable hardware as

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above, as evidenced by the unnoticeable delay when loading web-
pages. Thus, while it may be a few orders of magnitude more costly
than the baseline protocol, it provides privacy as a trade-off, which
the service provider can reason about.

9 DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Interoperability in E2EE messaging raises many technical and so-
ciotechnical challenges and issues to resolve before it sees wide-
spread deployment. Our proposal addresses the technical challenges
of trust and privacy of key transparency in this setting.

Trust Between SPs. It is likely the case that different E2EE service
providers use different implementations of a KT scheme. Further-
more, it may also be the case that the KT schemes are based on
different designs. These differences may result in different prop-
erties and differing degrees of trustworthiness. It is outside the
scope of this proposal to provide guidance on which schemes or
implementations SPs should adopt or how they rank in terms of
security or privacy features. It is up to an SP to decide whether
it will interoperate with another SP given what it knows about
the other provider and its trustworthiness and whether there is a
benefit to using PKT-IEE versus KT-IEE in that setting. In addition,
users of both may also exercise their will by deciding if they will
communicate across this “peering” path. In fact, the SP’s choice
to use the private or non-private version of the proposed schemes
may also play a part in users’ decision making.

Nonetheless, both (P)KT-IEE may be deployed in a heterogeneous
setting provided that each instance of the KT directory provide a
reliable and unique public STR that is available to the userbases
of the SPs and that each SPs KT look-up service forwards messages
to its counterpart’s KT look-up service.

Interoperability Obligations. While the DMA applies to a specific
region of the world and the SPs that operate within it, it is possible
that an SP (due to market control or other business reasons) tries to
avoid interoperating with other SPs. It may cite technical reasons
(like those described earlier in this section) or (unfounded) trust
concerns. Furthermore, a global SP (operating in many regions,
some covered by DMA) may decide to provide interoperability for
only those users covered by the DMA and not to the rest of its user
base. While such a partitioning of the userbase may not be “good
for business”, these kinds of issues do highlight the impact on user
freedoms and censorship inherent to the E2EE space. The DMA,
with (P)KT-IEE as a concrete piece, provide an impetus to further
normalize interoperability to the wider public.

Client Software. To realize deployment, SPs that decide to interop-
erate would need to provide enabling software on their client-side
devices. To use the proposed schemes, SPs would implement the
(P)KT-IEE protocols to communicate between SPs and also the verifi-
cation checking algorithms required by the other SPs’ KT scheme.
In effect, each client will have the ability to interact with not only their
own KT directory but also that of SPs that their SP has agreed to
interoperate with. While it may seem like a duplication of function-
ality and code, absent standardization, it is modular such that SPs
can decide which particular other SPs (and the required algorithms)
to incorporate into their own client software.

Spam Protection. Spam is a challenging issue even within a single
SP. Moderation and abuse are even more challenging. We do not
propose robust solutions to these latter two problems, but point to
how our two proposed schemes may provide some spam protection
and the trade-offs between the two. In KT-IEE every look-up request
presents the user_id of the requester which both SPs can observe. It
is then feasible to monitor users for problematic usage, e.g, looking
up many usernames, sending unusually high amounts of traffic,
excessive traffic to specific targets. An SP could enforce rate controls
and could in the extreme opt not to respond to look-up requests from
such abusive users. Of course, an SP should exercise caution
and hold a high bar to banning users. Also, a user may direct its SP
to only respond requests from its known contacts (which may be
known from another mechanism, such as used by E2EE apps for
contact discovery).

In contrast, PKT-IEE makes it impossible for a service provider to
know the identity of the user from the other SP from the messages,
since $h_{id}$ is no longer included or visible. This also means that
restricting messages to known contacts is also not possible. In that
that, the user, on their own device, could filter out such abusive
users (i.e. drop messages at the device). This is the trade-off of
heightened privacy and is an additional consideration for an SP to
interoperate with another SP. Furthermore, a malicious user or SP
may try to get specific users on another service banned, or, through
spurious key discrepancy reports, aim to lower the trust of a target
SP. Both of these issues depend on the robustness of the reporting
process (of both spam and key discrepancy). There are mechanisms
in the literature like message franking and user reporting features,
some privacy-preserving, that could be incorporated, however, we
do not analyze these in the context of our proposal and leave as
future work.

10 CONCLUSIONS
We proposed two schemes, one light-weight (KT-IEE) and the other
relatively heavier but still practical with privacy properties (PKT-
IEE), to address the problem of key transparency in the interoperable
E2EE messaging setting. This work is the first of its kind, as far as the
authors are aware, to address this challenge. With these schemes,
we make progress towards enabling E2EE messaging platforms
to meet the legal requirements as defined by the Digital Markets
Act to allow the users of platforms to communicate across service
boundaries. Our security and performance analysis show that both
of our schemes are feasible to deploy, modulo clients being updated
to speak our protocols and to be able to perform verification checks
on other SPs’ KT directories. PKT-IEE ensures that cross-platform
surveillance is mitigated at a cost of additional computation (while
remaining practical). Indeed, cross-platform user communications
are more private than same-platform communications since the SP
cannot see who the recipient of messages is on the other platform,
however it does not attempt to resist traffic analysis by colluding
SPs. We identify resistance to traffic analysis and (private) user
reporting in this setting as promising lines of research.

REFERENCES
A AUTHENTICATION PATH GENERATION AND VALIDATION

To use (P)KT-IEE we assume that KT directories are constructed as Merkle binary trees, as in CONIKS [7], which additionally introduces the notion of private prefixes to avoid revealing usernames in the data structure. We provide a brief overview here, for further details and explanations please refer to the original paper.

Each node in the tree represents a unique prefix i. Each branch of the tree adds either a 0 (left node) or a 1 (right node) to the prefix of the parent node. Every node other than a leaf node is hashed as follows:

\[ h = H(h_{l,0}||h_{r,1}) \]

Here l is the left node and r is right node. Leaf nodes are hashed as follows:

\[ h_{\text{leaf}} = H(\text{dev}_{\text{id}}||\text{key}||R_n) \]

Here, R_n is a random nonce. In order to provide a proof of inclusion of Alice’s key in the directory, the authentication path between Alice’s leaf node and the root is generated by SPX. This is a pruned tree containing the prefix path to the requested index as shown in Figure 4. All green leaf nodes in the tree represents other clients in the directory tree. The nodes in red have been included in the auth_path sent by SPX to Bob in the response to the key look-up request. In our example, Alice’s leaf node is:

\[ h_a = H(a_{\text{id}}||g^a||R_n) \]

and the auth_path is:

\[ \text{auth_path} = \{h_a, h_c, h''', h'\}. \]

Since, for privacy reasons, \( h_a \) is a commitment and not \( (a_{\text{id}}||g^a) \), the opening for the commitment, \( R_n \), is also sent in the response allowing \( h_a \) to be recalculated and compared for equality with that in the auth_path. If that is successful, \( b_{\text{id}} \), using the auth_path, recalculates the value of the root of the directory tree:

\[ \text{Root} = (H(H(H(h_c||h_a)||h'''))||h')) \]

It then performs following steps:

- Get the latest available public STR.
- Checks the signature on the public STR.
- If STR = STR', then encrypt message using Alice’s public key, otherwise alert Bob of validation failure.

Figure 4: An authentication path from Alice’s public key to the root node of the Merkle tree. Assuming Alice’s index, \( i_{\text{Alice}} \) is “001”

\[ \text{Root} = (H(H(H(h_c||h_a)||h'''))||h')) \]